

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 20th day of March, two thousand thirteen.

PRESENT:

JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.

JULIA OYEWO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

12-2179

RAY LAHOOD, SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

1 As an initial matter, Oyewo has abandoned her
2 alternative work schedule claim by raising it for the first
3 time in opposition to DOT's motion for summary judgment, see
4 *Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.
5 2006), and by presenting minimal argument in her brief on
6 appeal, *Norton v. Sam's Club*, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.
7 1998). Likewise, Oyewo waived her job duties claim by not
8 raising arguments concerning it in her brief on appeal.
9 *Id.*; *LoSacco v. City of Middletown*, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d
10 Cir. 1995).

11 Upon review of Oyewo's remaining claims, we conclude
12 that her appeal is without merit substantially for the
13 reasons articulated by the magistrate judge in his March 26,
14 2012 Memorandum and Order.

15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
16 court is hereby **AFFIRMED**.

17 FOR THE COURT:
18 Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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